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IMMIGRATION LAW IN THE SUPREME COURT:
THE FLAGGING SPIRIT OF THE LAW
Michael G. Heyman*
I. INTRODUCTION
Aliens usually lose in the Supreme Court. Taken alone, this is hardly sur-
prising. For many, the Court is the last stop in a legal journey that began in re-
moval proceedings. In prior administrative proceedings, before immigration
judges, many are found deportable. Typically, this leads to appeals before the
Board of Immigration Appeals,' the Circuit Courts of Appeal, and finally the
Supreme Court.
While it is not surprising that so few aliens prevail before the Court, that
view assumes that aliens have proceeded through long trails of failed proceed-
ings. However, that is not true. Many have succeeded at one or more levels
along the way. Yet, when they have gone before the Court, most have failed.
They have not failed attempting to receive constitutional protection, but as a
result of the Court's interpretation regarding relevant regulations, statutes, and
international documents.
At times mere criticism of the results of these cases would be trivial. All
courts make mistakes from time to time. The failure lies elsewhere. The Court
has consistently used a mechanical approach to interpretation and excluded an
exploration of statutory purpose. It has consistently submerged the purpose or
"spirit" of documents in favor of a faulty, literalist approach. At times, espe-
cially in procedural cases, this tendency has been driven by an obviously inhos-
pitable view of aliens. Although this sentiment is sometimes difficult to pin-
point, frequently expressing itself in very subtle ways, at times it comes to the
fore. For example, Justice Scalia, discussing selective prosecution as a defense
to removal, wrote:
Whereas in criminal proceedings the consequence of delay is merely to post-
Professor, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago.
1. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1 (1997).
2. The Court's treatment of constitutional challenges to immigration legislation has been
explored extensively. That literature has adopted the term "plenary power" to describe the extreme
deference paid to Congress in the face of these attacks. See e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigra-
tion Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 Sup. CT. REv. 255; Hiroshi
Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms
and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L J. 545 (1990).
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pone the criminal's receipt of his just deserts, in deportation proceedings the
consequence is to permit and prolong a continuing violation of United States
law. Postponing justifiable deportation (in the hope that the alien's status will
change-by, for example, marriage to an American citizen---or simply with
the object of extending the alien's unlawful stay) is often the principal object
of resistance to a deportation proceeding .... 3
The image of the alien litigant as someone who has no business being in
this country, yet is desperately trying to stay, has driven some decisions by both
the Court and lower courts. Representing part of this country's ambivalence
toward aliens, this anti-alien sentiment has surfaced with some frequency as the
Court has taken a kind of no-nonsense, gatekeeper approach to those whom it
regards as visa abusers.
Predominantly, these decisions are characterized by a mechanical brand of
interpretation, vaulting "plain meaning" above purpose and frequently overlook-
ing the reasons behind the documents under inspection. For example, rather than
inquiring into simply why domestic law prohibits the expulsion of aliens to
places where their "life or freedom would be threatened," 4 the Court became
obsessed with the significance of the term "would." 5 Rather than focusing on
why this protection was provided and how it comported with our obligations
under international law, the Court engaged in a parochial analysis of language
that ignored these obligations entirely. Worse, because of its over-reliance on
Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 6 so long as it
could defer to administrative interpretations, the Court has frequently engaged
in a perfunctory analysis of documents.
Statutory interpretation is an imprecise undertaking that must begin, at
least, with an analysis of the language used. The Court has not failed us because
of its insistence that language be regarded carefully. Rather, it has resorted to a
plain meaning approach that does violence to both statutory language and pur-
pose.
The classic exposition on purpose guiding interpretation came from Henry
Hart and Albert Sacks. As the dominant legal process thinkers of their genera-
tion, they admonished interpreters to strive to determine statutory purpose, and
subordinate the language to that purpose. So long as a court gives statutory lan-
3. Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 490 (1999).
4. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (1996). This language is from the provision of the Immigration
and Nationality Act captioned "Restriction on removal to a country where alien's life or freedom
would be threatened." It was formerly known as withholding of deportation, and these terms are
used at times in this article. See id.
5. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 422 (1984).
6. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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guage a meaning it will bear and that meaning would not violate any "estab-
lished policy of clear statement," 7 "it must decide what purpose should be at-
tributed to the statute" and then "interpret the words... immediately in question
so as to carry out the purpose as best it can .... ,"
Upholding that tradition, Eskridge and Frickey have carried forward this
idea. Because agencies are politically accountable, 9 the authors heralded Chev-
ron as an "important recognition of dynamic statutory interpretation in the mod-
em administrative state."10 They recognized that agencies were best positioned
to interpret statutes to fit harmoniously within the modem legal landscape. Hart
and Sacks themselves regarded agency interpretation as "conclusive if it is con-
sistent with the purpose properly to be attributed to the statute, and if it has been
arrived at with regard to the factors which should be taken into account in elabo-
rating it."" Language alone is barren, and courts should examine statutory lan-
guage as expressive of some legislative purpose. Though this may complicate
statutory analysis, the concept of statutes without purpose, some grouping of
disembodied words, is an absurdity that must be rejected.
This Article will analyze the Court's methodology through two lines of de-
cisions. First, it will examine the decisions on motions to reopen removal pro-
ceedings. The Court has concluded that these motions can be discretionarily
denied.' 2 Second, it will examine the cases on withholding of deportation 13 and
note the manner in which the Court's approach to these cases ignored the clear
dictates of humanitarian law. Rather than interpreting domestic law so that it
conforms to our international obligations, the Court has tried to shoehorn inter-
national documents into its interpretations of our domestic law. This contrasts
with how courts outside the United States have behaved, and effectively exalts
Chevron principles over the dictates of Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy.'
4
Finally, this Article will consider how Chevron itself presents a rationalization
7. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1374 (William Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip Frickey eds., 1994).
8. Id.
9. Eskridge and Frickey have long stressed the need to update statutory interpretation through
what they call dynamic interpretation. Rather than viewing statutes as having a fixed meaning in
time, they regard them as living documents whose meaning must frequently change over time.
See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Rea-
soning, 42 STAN. L REv. 321, 358-62 (1990).
10. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILnp P. FRIcKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 861 (2d ed. West Pub. Co. 1995).
11. HART& SACKS, supra note 7, at 1380.
12. The Court initially did this in the context of a case that was denied plenary consideration.
See INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981).
13. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
14. 6U.S. 64, 118(1804).
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and a means for the Court to avoid its duty to engage in judicial review.
The Court made choices that created this situation. Through its selection of
interpretive tools, the Court has chosen plain meaning over purpose. It has de-
ferred to Chevron, which clearly conflicts with Charming Betsy, and neglected
its obligation to adhere to international norms. Finally, in the very manner in
when it has implemented Chevron, the Court has made choices about whom to
regard as the agency for its purposes. 15 Despite the disconnect between Chevron
and the reality of administrative immigration decision-making, 6 and the ab-
sence of any real locus of decision-making within the entire immigration sys-
tem, the Court has deferred to those decisions least favorable to aliens.
II. RE-OPENING
A. INS v. Jong Ha Wang
17
INS v. Wang involved a routine case in which the Ninth Circuit and the
Board split on a matter of statutory interpretation. Unfortunately, the Court's
treatment of that split exemplifies all that is wrong with its handling of immigra-
tion cases. Its anti-alien tone and strained, ill-reasoned interpretation of the gov-
erning regulations launched the Court on the odd, misbegotten path on which it
now finds itself.
The Wangs came to this country as nonimmigrant treaty traders. Having
overstayed their visas they faced deportation. Based on their lengthy presence in
this country, they resisted deportation by seeking a "suspension of deporta-
tion."18 They claimed that their forced removal from the United States would
15. At times, the Court has selected the Board, at other times the Attorney General.
16. If one regards Chevron as being founded on the notion of agency expertise, it makes sense
to apply it after a careful consideration of the issues when agencies are construing technical provi-
sions of their governing statutes. However, that model often runs afoul of reality. In immigration
law we have different notions of "agency," including the BIA, the Attorney General, and
Immigration Judges, which brings different degrees of focus to the decision-making process. It is
one thing for the Board to decide a case in a published, precedent decision; it is quite another to
dispose of an important case in an unpublished opinion. See generally, Michael G. Heyman,
Judicial Review of Discretionary Immigration Decisionmaking, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 861, 870
(1994).
17. 450 U.S. 139 (1981).
18. At that time, the relief known as "suspension of deportation" was available to someone
who had been physically present in the United States for at least seven years continuously, was of
good moral character, and whose expulsion would cause extreme hardship to the alien, his spouse,
parent or child. That provision was changed substantially in 1996. Now, it requires a ten-year
presence and the alien must show that the removal would result in "exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship to the alien's spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence." It is now called cancellation of removal. 8
U.S.C. § 1229(b) (1996).
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produce extreme hardship to themselves and their U.S.-born minor children.
Their claims centered on economic loss and educational and cultural problems
for their children. The split between the Board and the Ninth Circuit centered
squarely on the content of the term "extreme hardship." Since any alien forced
to leave after a seven-year presence would experience some difficulties, hard-
ship obviously encompassed more.
The Wangs sought to prove their hardship claim in a new hearing.' 9 Thus,
the situation involved applicants seeking relief in an arena allowing the presen-
tation of evidence and witnesses testimony. The Board and Ninth Circuit simply
split on the issue of eligibility. The Board felt that economic hardship and dis-
advantage to minor children did not rise to the level of hardship; however, the
Ninth Circuit reversed. 20 The posture of the case before the Court was simple. It
only had to determine the kind of hardship claim necessary to entitle applicants
to a hearing and delineate the proper meaning of the term "extreme hardship."
The Court addressed both issues. First, it found that the Wangs failed to
meet the evidentiary requirement of the relevant regulation by not providing
affidavits in support of their hardship claim.21 Second, it found that the Board's
finding should not be disturbed simply because the Court "may prefer another
interpretation of the statute." 22 The Court simply affirmed the notion that agency
findings should not be overturned lightly; however, its dicta proved quite excep-
tional.
Surely the Wangs could have been regarded as visa abusers, especially
when the backlogs for their native Korea remained terribly long. Regardless,
that should not have informed the Court's interpretation of the controlling regu-
lation. At the time, a motion to reopen could be granted if an alien, through the
presentation of previously unavailable evidence, made out a prima facie case for
the relief sought. Their claim was based, then, on having become eligible for
relief during the pendency of the case. Commenting on the regulation that pro-
vided for such motions, the Court stated:
The present regulation is framed negatively; it directs the Board not to reopen
unless certain showings are made. It does not affirmatively require the Board
to reopen the proceedings under any particular condition. Thus, the regula-
tions may be construed to provide the Board with discretion in determining
under what circumstances proceedings should be reopened. 23
19. Having finally been in the United States more than seven years, the Wangs only satisfied
the eligibility requirements for suspension after their first hearing.
20. long Ha Wang v. INS, 622 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1980)(en banc).
21. See Wang, 450 U.S. at 143.
22. Id. at 144.
23. Id. at 143 n.5.
2002]
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Apparently, the Court regarded the prefatory language of the regulation
that indicates motions "shall not be granted unless" 24 the stipulated conditions
are met as signaling a distaste for such motions. Yet the language hardly says
that; it simply expresses the legal conditions that have to be satisfied to warrant
reopening.25 By emphasizing the "shall not" language, the Court twisted the
regulation to bestow discretion upon the Board to deny otherwise meritorious
motions. But why do that? Why grant that kind of carte blanche to the Board?
The same footnote went on to quote from a dissenting opinion in the Ninth
Circuit.26 In the Ninth Circuit case, Judge Wallace expressed an enormous an-
tipathy for aliens like the Wangs. He maintained:
If INS discretion is to mean anything, it must be that the INS has some lati-
tude in deciding when to reopen a case. The INS should have the right to be
restrictive. Granting such motions too freely will permit endless delay of de-
portation by aliens creative and fertile enough to continuously produce new
and material facts sufficient to establish a prima facie case. It will also waste
the time and efforts of immigration judges called upon to preside at hearings
automatically required by the prima facie allegations.
27
Thus, the Court invested the Board with a new kind of discretion. Having
constructed this zone of discretion in the regulation, it now granted the Board
the power to discretionarily deny motions, even if based on its dislike for the
movants. Through this one move, the Court misconstrued a very simple regula-
tion and made gratuitous, cynical, and offensive comments about the alien ap-
plicants. Apparently the Court believed the opinion in the Ninth Circuit decision
could be read as a "blueprint for any foreign visitor who has fertility, money,
and the ability to stay out of trouble with the police for seven years" 28 to become
a permanent resident. In the process, the Court construed the regulation to disfa-
vor people it obviously deemed unworthy. It did this without affording plenary
consideration, for there were neither briefs nor oral argument in Wang.29
Since Wang, both the regulations and relevant statutes it considered have
undergone substantial change. Reflecting the Court's thinking, the regulations
now expressly provide the Board with the discretion to deny a motion regardless
24. 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1979).
25. At that time, the evidence had to be material and unavailable at the former hearing. Id.
26. See Villena v. INS, 622 F.2d 1352 ( 9 1 Cir. 1980) (Wallace, J., dissenting).
27. Wang, 450 U.S. at 143 n.5 (quoting Villena, 622 F.2d at 1362 (Wallace, J., dissenting)).
28. Id. at 145 (quoting Villena, 622 F.2d at 1352 (Goodwin, J., dissenting)).
29. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun said they would have granted the petition for
certiorari and given the case plenary consideration. See Wang, 450 U.S. at 144.
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of its merits. 3° More significantly, the successor to the suspension of deportation
statute that the Court examined in Wang has been substantially amended. 3 1 Now,
to be eligible for what is known as cancellation of removal, 32 a nonpermanent
resident must have been here for ten years.33 Congress has likewise changed the
way in which the period of presence is calculated. The "Notice to Appear" in
removal proceedings legally marks the end of the alien's physical presence in
the United States, thus avoiding the problems confronted in cases such as Wang.
Immigration benefits simply cannot be garnered through post-service time spent
here.3 Finally, the number of motions has been reduced to one and for most
purposes, that motion must be filed within ninety days from the date of entry
regarding a final order of removal.35
Wang reflected the value of streamlining the administrative process to
avoid frivolous and dilatory tactics, and subsequent legislative and regulatory
changes enhance its potency. 36 However, critics of these changes can take some
solace, since those such as the Wangs may not suffer unduly. They may encoun-
ter difficulties upon their forced return to their homelands, but they do not face
any apparent challenge to survival itself. Unfortunately, the Court's next foray
into this area was much more ominous.
30. "The Board has discretion to deny a motion to reopeneven if the party moving has made
out a prima facie case for relief." 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(a) (1999). This provision was added through 61
Fed. Reg. 18904 (Apr. 29, 1996). The change was inspired by the Court's language in Stone v.
INS, 514 U.S. 386, 399 (1995). The Court talked of Congress' "fundamental purpose... 'to ab-
breviate the process of judicial review ... in order to frustrate certain practices... whereby per-
sons subject to deportation were forestalling departure by dilatory tactics in the courts."' Stone, at
399 (quoting Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217, 224 (1963)).
31. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (b)(1)(A) (1997).
32. See supra note 18.
33. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (b)(1)(A) (1997).
34. Id. at § 1229b (d)(1).
35. 8 U.S.C. §1229a (c)(6)(A) (1996). For asylum cases, the one exception exists in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a (c)(6)(A)(ii). However, the claim must be based on a change in country conditions, not in
the alien's situation.
36. Wang by no means stands alone in its attitude toward litigious aliens. The Court expressed
its disgruntlement several years later very pointedly in INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444 (1985).
In a suspension of deportation case involving the residency period accrued during proceedings, the
Court was most disapproving of the treatment by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. The major-
ity held, "[in administering this country's immigration laws, the Attorney General and the INS
confront an onerous task even without the addition of judicially augmented incentives to take
meritless appeals, engage in repeated violations, and undertake other conduct solely to drag out
the deportation process." Id. at 450-51.
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B. INS v. Abudu31
Assibi Abudu had a long and troubled stay in the United States. He origi-
nally entered the United States as a student in 1965. He maintained that status,
graduated from medical school, and became a licensed physician in the United
States. After having married a United States citizen, he overstayed his visa and
was eventually convicted of a drug offense in 1981. He was found deportable in
1982, and the Board dismissed his appeal in 1984.38
In 1985, he filed a motion to reopen, seeking asylum and withholding of
deportation for the first time. By his account, he had been visited by a highly
placed official in the Ghanean government, ostensibly because physicians were
in short supply in Ghana. Abudu claimed that he was concerned that the offi-
cial's actual purpose involved discovering the location of Abudu's brother, an
exiled enemy of the Rawlings government. Likewise, he feared that he was be-
ing lured back because of his close association with Lt. Col. Joshua Hamidu, the
government's key enemy.39 The Board denied the motion, concluding that the
"visitor was admittedly a long-time friend of the respondent's who in fact may
have been paying a purely social visit."40
As with Wang, the Court could have handled this case simply and merely
set the standard for review of the Board's determinations. It went well beyond
that. Although it claimed that the case was only about "the standard that a Court
of Appeals must apply when reviewing the BIA's conclusion that an alien has
not reasonably explained his failure to assert his asylum claim at the outset," 4'
the Court addressed far more.
First, elevating footnote to text,42 the Court quoted extensively from Wang
and reiterated its view that the regulation on reopening creates a zone of discre-
tion for the Board.43 Thus, comments in dicta from a Wang footnote now en-
joyed a grander status in the Court's caselaw. Explaining why such motions are
disfavored, Justice Stevens stated that "[tihere is a strong public interest in
bringing litigation to a close as promptly as is consistent with the interest in giv-
ing the adversaries a fair opportunity to develop and present their respective
cases."" The Court's choice of authority and the analogies it drew45 showed a
37. 485 U.S. 94 (1988).
38. See Abudu v. INS, 802 F.2d 1096, 1098 (9dh Cir. 1986).
39. See id. at 1099.
40. Abudu, 485 U.S. at 98.
41. Id. at 104.
42. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1979).
43. See Abudu, at 105.
44. Id. at 107.
45. The Court cited cases involving the former Interstate Commerce Commission, the Envi-
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clear insensitivity to what was at issue in Abudu's case and demonstrated what
one commentator has called its "docket-clearing mindset."46
Not content to simply repeat itself, the Court created a "super-strong"
breed of deference to agency decisions. Treating the Executive Branch as a
monolith, it wrote:
In sum, although all adjudications by administrative agencies are to some de-
gree judicial and to some degree political -- and therefore an abuse-of-
discretion standard will often apply to agency adjudications not governed by
specific statutory commands -- INS officials must exercise especially sensi-
tive political functions that implicate questions of foreign relations, and
therefore the reasons for giving deference to agency decisions on petitions
for reopening or reconsideration in other administrative contexts apply with
even greater force in the INS context.
47
The Court again had a choice. It could have recognized the potential harm
that Dr. Abudu faced, and adjusted its standard of review to accommodate his
human rights interest. Instead, rejecting that approach, it characterized the
Board's decision as political and relied on Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong.
48
Hampton involved a challenge to a Civil Service Commission rule requir-
ing citizenship for employment in the federal civil service. In an opinion also
written by Justice Stevens, the Court found that the Civil Service Commission
lacked the democratic legitimacy to establish such a rule.49 Hampton undercut
the Court's position in Abudu. In Hampton, Justice Stevens wrote:
It is the business of the Civil Service Commission to adopt and enforce regu-
lations which will best promote the efficiency of the federal civil service.
That agency has no responsibility for foreign affairs, for treaty negotiations,
for establishing immigration quotas or conditions of entry, or for naturaliza-
tion policies.... On the contrary, the Commission performs a limited and
specific function. 50
The same can be said of the Board. Originally created by the Attorney General,
ronmental Protection Agency and similar agencies that addressed licensing and other technical
issues. Id. at 107 n.ll.
46. See Kevin R. Johnson, Responding to the "Litigation Explosion": The Plain Meaning of
Executive Branch Primacy over Immigration, 71 N.C. L REv. 413, 477 (1993).
47. Abudu, 485 U.S. at 110 (footnotes omitted).
48. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
49. See id. at 115-17.
50. Id. at 114.
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the Board's members decide immigration appeals. The Board merely operates as
an administrative tribunal. Though its decisions may obliquely have some effect
on relationships with other countries, the Board enjoys no more authority to
forge foreign policy than the Civil Service Commission. 5' Yet, rather than fur-
thering the humanitarian interests recognized the prior term in INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca,52 the Court here turned a deaf ear to the alien.
C. INS v. Doherty
53
Doherty seemed likely to attract the attention of the Court and the country
generallyi4 Doherty, a former member of the Provisional Irish Republican
Army, was tried in Belfast for the killing of a British soldier in 1980. He es-
caped prior to a verdict, was convicted in absentia, and later sentenced to life
imprisonment. 55 After an extraordinary saga, he eventually found himself em-
.broiled in a case involving extradition, deportation, numerous other legal pro-
ceedings, and the intervention of two Attorneys General.
5 6
His case reached the Court only after he had succeeded twice before the
Board, which was reversed by each Attorney General. Thus, when the case
reached the Court, it had to rule on the correctness of Attorney General Thorn-
burgh's reversal of the Board on the issue of his motion to reopen to prove enti-
tlement to asylum and withholding. The case splintered the Court 7 and further
heightened the confusion surrounding motions to reopen.
In many respects, Doherty mirrored Abudu. In each case, the alien sought
to reopen to prove entitlement to asylum and withholding and was denied at the
51. Oddly, the foreign affairs power is not mentioned explicitly in the United States Constitu-
tion. As Louis Henkin said, "Itihe attempt to build all the foreign affairs powers of the federal
government with the few bricks provided by the Constitution has not been accepted as success-
ful." Louis HENKiN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITuTION 17 (1972).
52. 480 U.S 421 (1987). Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens maintained that "[dleportation
is always a harsh measure; it is all the more replete with danger when the alien makes a claim that
he or she will be subject to death or persecution if forced to return to his or her home country." Id.
at 449.
53. 502 U.S. 314 (1992).
54. The case drew an unusual level of public attention. Among the numerous briefs filed with
the Court included one drafted by 132 members of Congress. Its membership was diverse, includ-
ing a wide array of the political spectrum, including Utah Republican, Sen. Orrin Hatch. See gen-
erally Brief for Amici Curiae Members of the United States Senate and Members of the United
States House of Representatives in Support of Respondent, INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314 (1992)
(No. 90-925).
55. See Doherty, 502 U.S. at 317.
56. The two Attorneys General were Edwin Meese and Richard Thornburgh.
57. The opinion for the Court was written by Chief Justice Rehnquist. Only Part I of the
case drew a majority, in which Justices White, Blackmun, O'Connor, and Kennedy joined Chief
Justice Rehnquist. See Doherty, at 316.
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agency level. Yet, only part of the Court's opinion commanded a majority of the
justices. Justice Scalia dissented in part58 from the Court's conclusion that the
Attorney General had not abused his "broad discretion in considering motions to
"t59reopen.
Noting that even discretion "has its legal limits, ' 60 Justice Scalia departed
from the mechanical approach and broad language that led to so much rubber-
stamping in prior cases. 61 Instead, he began by resisting the Court's view that a
motion to reopen was similar to asking that a judgment be reopened, something
that rarely takes place.62 Rather, Justice Scalia analogized the motion to a "re-
mand for further proceedings."6 3 Propelled by that purpose-oriented approach to
the regulation, he dissented sharply based on the Court's conflation of motions
seeking to prove asylum and those seeking withholding. Because withholding is
mandatory relief, Justice Scalia would have narrowed the Attorney General's
power significantly." Even conceding that "the act of reopening a concluded
proceeding is itself a discretionary one" 65 he concluded that it was not as discre-
tionary as the term reopening might suggest.
Though the language "as discretionary" might seem bewildering, Justice
Scalia seemed to be calling for what Professor Kevin Johnson called a "hard
look" approach to judicial review of this kind of agency decision making. 66
Withholding of deportation prohibits the Attorney General from removing a
refugee to a country in which her life or freedom would be threatened. Because
of the strong humanitarian concern expressed by this principle of withholding of
deportation, Justice Scalia seemed correct in carefully scrutinizing the Attorney
General's decision to deny a hearing on that issue. The majority of the Court
simply repeated the "mumbo jumbo" discretion talk of prior Courts.
A second problem with Doherty consists of its unitary approach to agency
58. See id. at 329 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justices Stevens and Souter also joined Justice Scalia
in dissent.
59. Id. at 326 (plurality).
60. Id. at 330.
61. Abudu did not stand alone. On other occasions, the Court ruled similarly on motions to
reopen. See INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444, 449-52 (1985); INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183,
195 (1984).
62. See Doherty, at 330 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 331 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
64. See id. at 332 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Unfortunately, he did defer to the Attorney General
on the asylum issue, stating that "Doherty is a sufficiently unsavory character not to be granted
asylum in this country." Id. at 333 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 341 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
66. Kevin R. Johnson, A 'Hard Look' at the Executive Branch's Asylum Decisions, 1991 UTAH
L REv. 279, 310 (1991). Acknowledging the variety of choices of models for judicial review of
agency decision making, Professor Johnson suggested that the hard look approach seemed particu-
larly appropriate where the questions were largely legal and the stakes great. Id. at 324-25.
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decision making. Countless opinions refer to the Attorney General's decisions,
but in reality, immigration judges and the Board make most decisions. 67 Indeed,
Doherty represented one of the few exercises of review power by the Attorney
General on record. Thus, though Chevron provides an approach to agency deci-
sion making, the decisions of immigration judges, the Board, and the Attorney
General would seem to stand on very different footings and command different
levels of deference. Immigration judges have immediate access to witnesses and
evidence. The Board hears countless appeals and has built a substantial reposi-
tory of legal expertise, at least as expressed in its precedent decisiolis.6 Finally,
the Attorney General is the most politically accountable member of this group-
ing and has the highest visibility. However, if Chevron is about deference based
on comparative competence and respect for administrative decisions, the Board
seems to require the most deference, a point neglected in Doherty perhaps be-
cause of the Court's muddled, monolithic image of the immigration system.
Competence and authority are simply not synonymous.
The cases on reopening have. severely constricted judicial review. Ani-
mated by a cynical view of alien applicants and a strangely focused view both of
the purpose of the motion and meaning of the regulation, they have consistently
denied requests for a forum in which to be heard. However, the cases do not
deny aliens access to relief in the first instance. Unfortunately, this cannot be
said of the Court's body of law on withholding of deportation. There, the Court
has twisted the relevant domestic and international law and shown almost a dis-
dain for its position among courts in the world community.
I. WITHHOLDING OF DEPORTATION
Until comparatively recently, the United States had no single, ideologically
neutral legislation on asylum and refugee law.69 In 1948, in the aftermath of
World War II, Congress passed the Displaced Persons Act,70 our first major
piece of refugee legislation. This law addressed the plight of those stranded by
the war and ultimately provided for the admission of 400,000 people. Thereaf-
ter, the United States episodically embarked on various programs., in response to
67. The Attorney General is charged with the administration and enforcement of our inunigra-
tion laws. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (1996).
68. The Board chooses the decisions it wishes to count as precedential on certain issues.
"[S]elected decisions designated by the Board shall serve as precedents in all proceedings involv-
ing the same issue or issues." 8 CFR § 3.1(g) (1997).
69. For a discussion of the odd history in this area, see generally G LoEsciE & JoHN A.
SCANLAN, CALCULATED KINDNESS: REFUGEES AND AMERICA'S HALF-OPEN DOOR, 1945 TO THE
PREsENT (1986).
70. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, ch. 647, 62 Stat. 1009 (repealed 1950).
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problems throughout the world. The 1965 amendments to the Immigration and
Nationality Act created a seventh preference category that ultimately provided
permanent residence for refugees, 71 but was limited to those who had either fled
a "Con-mmunist or Comminunist-dominated country" [or one] within the general
area of the Middle East. 72 Refugee rights were still ideologically linked, though
not country-specific.
That changed with the enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980.73 Congress
created a single definition of refugee and clearly sought to bring our domestic
law into conformity with our international obligations.74 Indeed, in the cele-
brated case of Cardoza-Fonseca,75 the Court reiterated the primacy of Congress'
purpose to "bring United States refugee law into conformance with the 1967
United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees," thus harmonizing
our domestic law and international obligations.76
Unfortunately, domestic practice had been a muddle in its interpretation of
critical terms of both domestic and international law. Yet that was somewhat
understandable, given the "hydra-headed" nature of our refugee law. With the
passage of the Refugee Act, Congress provided several avenues of protection for
refugees. First, the United States created the overseas refugee program through
which refugees are admitted to this country. Thus, at the beginning of the fiscal
year, the President consults with Congress on the plans for refugee admissions. 77
Thereafter, the President issues a determination that sets numerical ceilings for
the year and specifies the places from which the refugees will be admitted.
Second, aliens present in the United States may apply for asylum under our
immigration laws.78 To achieve that status, they must satisfy the statutory defini-
71. Although they entered via conditional entry, they had a ready path to adjustment of status
two years thereafter.
72. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L No. 89-236, § 3, 79 Stat.
911,913.
73. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1521-24 (1982)).
74. The internationally accepted definition of refugee is based on the Geneva Convention and
U.N. Protocol, to which the United States is a signatory. See United Nations Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Convention]; United Na-
tions Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S.
267 [hereinafter Protocol]. Under Article I(1) of the Protocol, "[tihe States Parties to the present
Protocol undertake to apply articles 2 to 34 inclusive of the Convention to refugees as hereinafter
defined." Id. at 606 U.N.T.S. 268.
75. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
76. 480 U.S. at 436.
77. Sections 207 and 209 of the Immigration and Nationality Act govern the process through
which the overseas program operates and refugees ultimately become permanent residents. See 8
U.S.C. §§ 1157, 1159 (1988).
78. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1996).
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tion of refugee, which essentially duplicates the Convention definition. A grant
of asylum can then lead to adjustment to permanent resident status after one
year for asylees, so long as they remain refugees within the meaning of our
laws. However, though they may adjust their status, most feel that the asylum
itself may be discretionarily denied. 79 Thus, as construed, it does not provide a
mandatory form of human rights protection.
By contrast, the third form of protection for refugees, withholding of depor-
tation, binds the Attorney General, preventing her from removing a refugee to a
place where her life or freedom would be threatened.8s Though this section es-
sentially repeats the definition of refugee, it is not identical. Rather, it acts as an
absolute constraint on the Attorney General, applies to aliens generally, and
requires that their life or freedom would be threatened based on one of the five
factors mentioned in the definition of refugee.8' Thus, this third form of refugee
protection might seem to impose a different burden on the withholding applicant
than on the asylum seeker.
In Cardoza-Fonseca the Court decided what showing of persecution the
asylum seeker must make. Not until then did the Court provide a meaningful
gloss on the term "well-founded fear of persecution." 2 Yet, withholding might
be different. Though, arguably, an essential right of refugees is to be free from
79. The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that the "Attorney General may grant asy-
lum' to a qualifying alien. 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (b) (emphasis added). This has usually been inter-
preted to mean that asylum may be denied even if the alien meets the statutory criteria. However,
Professor James Hathaway and Anne K. Cusick have argued that this misconstrues the require-
ments of international law, asserting that asylum must be granted where legally warranted. See
James C. Hathaway & Anne K. Cusick, Refugee Rights Are Not Negotiable, 14 GEo. IMMIGR. L J.
481 (2000) [hereinafter Hathaway]. They stated:
Our analysis below aims to show how the substitution by the United States
Supreme Court of discretion for entitlement is irreconcilable to our treaty ob-
ligations, in that it creates protection gaps which expose genuine Convention
refugees to both the risk of refoulement and, more generally, to treatment be-
low international norms.
Id. at 488.
80. "Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), the Attorney General may not remove an alien to
a country if the Attorney General decides that the alien's life or freedom would be threatened in
that country because of the alien's race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion." 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (b)(3)(A) (1996).
81. The definition of refugee is more grudging than might be expected. Not only must one
have a well-founded fear of persecution, but the persecution must be feared because of one of five
factors: race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion. See
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1996).
82. 'This standard is key to the definition of refugee. Until Caroza-Fonseca, domestic practice
was inconsistent, if not simply wrong, in its interpretation of this standard. The definition now
appears at 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(42) (1998).
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exposure to danger from the forced return to places that exposed them to threats
to life or freedom, administrative practice trampled that apparent right.8 3 Thus,
when the case of Pedrag Stevic came before the Court in 1983, the Court had an
opportunity to reaffirm our adherence to international obligations and set a sin-
gle standard for both the asylum seeker and withholding applicant?8 The Court
could bring coherence to our humanitarian law by affording refuge to those with
legitimate fears of persecution, and surely forsake the unspeakable of counte-
nancing the forced return of refugees to places where they were refugees. It did
neither.
A. INS v. Stevic 5
INS v. Stevic provided the Court with its first opportunity to interpret the
Refugee Act. Raising an apparently simple issue, it required the Court to deter-
mine the burden borne by an alien seeking withholding of deportation. Unfortu-
nately, in addressing this task, the Court mangled both the language and purpose
of the Act, obdurately insisting that the Refugee Act had scarcely changed pre-
existing law.
Stevic's stay in the United States began in 1976, when he entered for tem-
porary purposes.8 He was found deportable later in that year, did not depart on
time, but married a United States citizen and sought reclassification on that ba-
sis. Sadly, she died pending the processing of his application. Ultimately, he
sought to reopen deportation proceedings to seek asylum and withholding.87 It
was then, for the first time, that he claimed a fear of persecution were he re-
turned to his native Yugoslavia.
He claimed that he feared persecution because of his political activities in
an 6migr6 anti-communist organization known as the Ravna Gora.8 His father-
in-law, a United States citizen, had also been a member, yet was imprisoned
while traveling in Yugoslavia for violating the hostile propaganda laws of that
country which criminalized any criticism of government policy made anywhere
83. Regarding In re Dunnar, 14 I. & N. Dec. 310 ( BIA 1973), the Board noted that the Proto-
col was self-executing, having "the force and effect of an act of Congress." Id. at 313. Yet despite
that, it insisted on the fact that withholding was both discretionary and required the alien to estab-
lish a "clear probability" of persecution to be granted this remedy.
84. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984). Professor Hathaway and Ms. Cusik argue that only in
a unified system in which the burdens are identical can we honor our duty to refugees. See Hatha-
way, supra note 79, at 513.
85. 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
86. The facts appear more fully in the Second Circuit opinion than in that of the Court. Stevic
v. Sava, 678 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1982).
87. By regulation, an application for asylum automatically also became one for withholding.
88. See Stevic, 678 F.2d at 403.
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in the world. His father-in-law served three years in prison and, apparently,
committed suicide after release.
The Board twice denied motions to reopen, essentially on the grounds that
Stevic failed to make out a prima facie case for the relief sought.8 9 However,
since the Board previously held that withholding required proof of a "clear
probability" of persecution, he had presumably failed to meet that standard. The
Second Circuit reversed, concluding that its "obligation to assure observance of
correct legal standards under this mandatory provision is to be contrasted with
the more limited role of courts in reviewing BIA decisions under grants of dis-
cretionary authority . . . ."90 Having determined that withholding should be
granted, on a standard "far short of a 'clear probability' that an individual will be
singled out for persecution,''1 the court used its review power to reverse the
Board.
In reaching that result, the court gave primacy to the Protocol and its inter-
pretation in the High Commissioner's Handbook.92 Thus, because the Handbook
had been specifically created to aid governments in the interpretation of the Pro-
tocol, the Second Circuit concluded that it should be accorded "considerable
weight." 93 According to the court, the Board had applied an incorrect standard,
one inconsistent with the Protocol and its interpretation in the Handbook.
The Supreme Court's opinion provided a stunning contrast to that of the
Second Circuit. Partaking of a strange parochialism, the Court proceeded to
emphasize domestic law over its international counterparts. Though the Court
acknowledged that the Refugee Act was passed to "establish a systematic
scheme for admission and resettlement of refugees," 94 it nevertheless insisted
that the "Protocol was largely consistent with existing law."95 Quoting from the
Board's opinion in Dunnar, it concluded that the Protocol had "effected no sub-
stantial changes in the application of section 243(h), either by way of burden of
89. See id.
90. Id at 409.
91. Id
92. The office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has pub-
lished a handbook on refugee issues that gives detailed analyses of refugee law. It is cited fre-
quently throughout the world. See generally UNHCR, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRTEI
FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS (1979) [hereinafter Handbook].
93. Stevic, 678 F.2d at 409.
94. Stevic, 467 U.S. at 425.
95. Id at 417. Elsewhere, the Court struck the same note, concluding that "[e]xisting domestic
statutory law in 1968 was largely consistent with the Protocol." Id. at 428. Indeed, though the
Court conceded that prior law made withholding discretionary, it then neutered the difference by
noting that the "Attorney General, however, could naturally accommodate the Protocol simply by
exercising his discretion to grant such relief ... " Id
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proof, coverage, or manner of arriving at decisions." 96 This it said despite the
fact that withholding was discretionary under prior domestic law, thus providing
a stark contrast with the Protocol.97
At this point, the Court's task was simple. Since domestic law had em-
braced the "clear probability" standard, it only remained to determine whether
there was any evidence in the Refugee Act of a clear departure from that stan-
dard. It resolved this issue largely through its gloss on the word "would." Noting
that it was inferring such a standard from the "bare language" of the section on
withholding,98 it nevertheless concluded that "would" did not denote "might" or
"could."99 Rather than trying to make sense of the phrase "life or freedom would
be threatened," the Court emphasized the word "would," interpolating in the
word "persecution" at the end despite its absence. In other words, the Court
simply inserted the term "persecuted" rather than inquire whether "threatened"
was intended to be synonymous.
The Court's reasoning was wrong on several levels. First, it gives primacy
to the qualifier "would" without asking what it relates to. Since the Convention
and domestic law use the word "threatened," it is odd not to even note that us-
age. Had the Court bothered to inquire, it could easily have concluded that
"threatened" signified something less than "persecution." A plain-meaning
analysis would have at least yielded that result. However, the Court's failure
went deeper.
Article 31 of the Convention also uses the term "threatened."' It prevents
contracting States from imposing penalties on "refugees . . . coming directly
from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened in the sense of Arti-
cle 1 . . . ."'0' This completely dissolves any ambiguity with the Article 33 us-
age. Rather than repeating the entire definition of refugee, the drafters of the
Convention used the "threatened" language as a kind of shorthand. The refer-
ence to Article 1 makes this clear.1°2 But even were this not so, one would ex-
pect that the Court would ask why the standard for withholding relief would be
more demanding than that for asylum. In addition, one would also expect the
96. Id. at 418-419 (quoting In re Dunnar, 14 L & N. Dec. at 323).
97. Though the United States had not acceded to the Geneva Convention, our accession to the
Protocol bound us to its terms. Under Article I of the Protocol, "It]he States Parties to the present
Protocol undertake to apply articles 2 to 34 inclusive of the Convention to refugees as hereinafter
defined." Protocol, supra note 74, at 6225.
98. See Stevic, 467 U.S. at 422.
99. See id.
100. See Convention, supra note 74, at 174 (Art. 31(1)).
101. Id.
102. Paul Weis has made the same point. "In the course of drafting the words 'country of ori-
gin,' 'territories where their life or freedom was threatened' and 'country in which he is perse-
cuted' were used interchangeably." PAUL WEIS, THE REFuGEE CONVENTnON, at 303 (1995).
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Court to consider why Congress and the Convention drafters would, to use Pro-
fessor Hathaway's language, create a "subset of super-refugees."'
0 3
Instead, the Court resisted a more generous interpretation of withholding.
Repudiating the Second Circuit's position, the Court concluded that:
[The Second Circuit's] decision rests on the mistaken premise that every
alien who qualifies as a 'refugee' under the statutory definition is also enti-
tled to a withholding of deportation under § 243(h). We find no support for
this conclusion in either the language of § 243(h), the structure of the
amended Act, or the legislative history.1°4
Without examining the purpose of this provision, it essentially based the deci-
sion on the presence of one word, and botched its interpretation there. Rejecting
any reference to purpose, the Court essentially approved the deportation of refu-
gees to places of great danger, a thoroughly counterintuitive move.
This contrasted sharply with the Second Circuit's view. Championing
America's theme of "welcoming homeless refugees to our shores,"'"' 5 that court
could not tolerate the anomaly of subjecting applicants to the stringent standard
argued for by the government. By its view, "[w]here the choice is between a
concededly rigorous standard which would subject some potential asylees to the
risk of persecution and a more generous one which tilts toward protection from
such risk, the strongly humanitarian rhetoric accompanying the legislation is
helpful to interpretation."'0'
From the perspective of damage control, there is some solace in the notion
that withholding applicants also seek asylum and the likelihood of a discretion-
ary denial of asylum is not great. Yet, from the perspective of the development
of humanitarian law, the Court's position is disturbing. Faced with an opportu-
nity to express our commitment to humanitarian law and international norms,
the Court effected a parochial retreat in an ill-conceived, poorly reasoned opin-
ion showing no sensitivity to the interests and human concerns involved. Indeed,
the following year, in Cardoza-Fonseca, it repeated the inanities of Stevic,
rather than retreating from them.' °7
The Court's first interpretation of the Refugee Act is troubling, but this was
103. Hathaway, supra note 79, at 485.
104. Stevic, 467 U.S. at 428.
105. Stevic, 678 F.2d at 408.
106. Id.
107. Comparing Stevic, the Court said that "Article 33.1 requires that an applicant satisfy two
burdens: first, that he or she be a 'refugee,' i.e., prove at least a 'well-founded fear of persecution';
second, that the 'refugee' show that his or her life or freedom 'would be threatened' if deported."
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 441.
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not to be its last effort in the area of withholding. In the two cases that followed
in the 1990s, it confronted some immense challenges to humanitarian law. It
would be called upon to decide both those who could be denied withholding
because of their criminal conduct abroad and the very geographic reach of hu-
manitarian law.
B. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council 108
The mass migration of aliens to the United States has long been troubling.
In recent years, the United States has witnessed the sad spectacle of large groups
of aliens setting sail from Cuba, Haiti, and elsewhere. Many often die at sea or
otherwise suffer, simply in hopes of making it to the protection of our shores.
Surely, we cannot hope to accommodate all who seek to come here. Thus, in
1981, President Reagan initiated an interdiction program that included a screen-
ing process to determine whether the interdicted aliens presented credible fears
of persecution.
Following the overthrow of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide of Haiti in
1991, thousands fled Haiti, were screened to determine their refugee status, but
were not summarily repatriated. Policy changed profoundly one year later. In
what has become known as the Kennebunkport Order, President Bush directed
the Coast Guard to intercept vessels sailing illegally to the United States and
return their passengers to their countries of origin.' °9 Though not explicitly men-
tioning Haiti, the day after the order was signed the White House Press Secre-
tary said that the President had "issued an executive order which will permit the
U.S. Coast Guard to begin returning Haitians picked up at sea directly to
Haiti. ' 110 In response to this stepped-up policy of interdiction, a lawsuit was
filed against the INS, the Attorney General and others, claiming that this inter-
diction and repatriation violated both the Refugee Act and the Protocol."' After
the plaintiff's success in the Second Circuit," 2 the government successfully peti-
tioned for certiorari and the case came before the Court.
Though complex, much of Sale turned on the meaning of the language of
the two governing provisions, § 243(h) of the INA and Article 33 of the Con-
vention. The immigration statute prohibited the Attorney General from returning
any alien to a place of danger"13 and the Convention prohibited any "Contracting
108. 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
109. Exec. Order No. 12,807, 3 C.F.R. 303 (1993), reprinted in 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1994).
110. Sale, at 166 n. 13 (quoting Press Release, United States White House (May 24, 1992)).
111. See id. at 166.
112. See Haitian Centers Council v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir. 1992).
113. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iii) (1996).
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State" from doing that.' 14 Perhaps because of the looming issues of foreign pol-
icy and a resultant reluctance to disturb executive policy, the Court focused on
the issue of the extraterritorial nature of our domestic and treaty obligations.
Thus, its inquiry was guided by the presumption that "Acts of Congress do not
,,115
ordinarily apply outside our borders ....
From this premise, the Court repeatedly noted that the statute's reference is
to the Attorney General, not the President, the Coast Guard, or some other arm
of the federal government. 116 Thus, despite the Court's wide-ranging discussion,
it was driven by this almost single-minded focus on the Attorney General and
her domestic duties. This led it to conclude that all data led "unerringly to the
conclusion that it applies in only one context: the domestic procedures by which
the Attorney General determines whether deportable and excludable aliens re-
main in the United States."'1 17 Acknowledging this remarkable and probably
non-contemplated act of going off to the high seas and turning people back to
places of danger, noting astonishingly that "such actions may even violate the
spirit of Article 33,"' 18 the Court still upheld the government's position that our
humanitarian obligations ended at our borders. Perhaps for one of the only times
in our legal history, the Court openly shunned the spirit of the law in favor of its
notions of linguistic purity and necessity.
Yet this result was compelled by neither the language nor spirit of the law.
The Court was construing documents of concededly international scope. Both
domestic and international refugee law, by necessity, deal with matters that tran-
scend borders. Thus, the presumption against extraterritoriality "evaporates
when a statute that regulates distinctively international subject matter ... is in-
volved." 119 The presumption was simply inapposite. Worse, it was senseless, for
the Refugee Act and Protocol bound this country to respect the rights of refu-
gees, foremost among which was the right to be safe from forced repatriation.
Thus, the Court's construction of the law totally ignored our obligations as a
country to honor these rights. The Act and Protocol bind the United States. The
INA refers to the Attorney General because she has the legal authority to apply
our immigration law. If she is prohibited from returning a refugee to a place of
114. See Convention, supra note 74, Art. 33(1), 189 U.N.T.S. at 176.
115. Sale, 509 U.S. at 173.
116. See id.
117. Id. at 177.
118. Id. at 183.
119. Respondent's Brief at 33, McNary v. Haitian Centers Council, 969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir.
1992) (No. 92-344)(Dec. 21, 1992), 1992 WL 541267 (authored by Harold Hongju Koh for the
Allard K. Lowenstein Human Rights Project at Yale Law School). Professor Koh went on to
explain that the presumption was a "tool of statutory construction which 'serves to protect against
unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could result in international
discord."' Id. at 34-35 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 247 (1992)).
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danger, so too are all agents of the government. Surely the President conducts
foreign policy, but as Professor Koh said, "ours is a foreign policy conducted
under law."'
12
Only Justice Blackmun dissented. By his view, the majority had inverted
our domestic and international obligations, reflecting what he later called a "dis-
turbing disregard" on the part of the Court for its obligations when construing
international law. 2 1 Rather than following the presumption against extraterrito-
riality, Justice Blackmun suggested a different interpretive tack. He suggested
that we interpret our domestic law so as not to violate the "law of nations if any
other possible construction remains."' 22 The Convention's categorical language
should control and no contracting state could return any alien "in any manner
whatsoever"' 23 to a place of grave danger. Blackmun clearly chafed at the
Court's having "reasoned backwards to construe the language of Article 33.1 -
a global convention - in light of its interpretation of American immigration
law."' 24 Blackmun would have given primacy to international law, recognizing
that it represented a distillation of decades of worldwide experience in humani-
tarian law, so that it should trump any domestic law with which it conflicts.
Professor Koh's position was even simpler. Though linguistic indetermi-
nacy swirled about the case, some things were clear. Koh urged on the Court
one fundamental, guiding notion, one that would dissolve any linguistic difficul-
ties: the "core purpose" of § 243(h) was "to embed into United States law our
humanitarian international obligation not to deliver fleeing refugees into the
hands of their persecutors." 5 Had the Court followed that simple notion, had it
taken seriously its role in the international community, it would have had the
courage to repudiate the interdiction policy as violating domestic and interna-
tional law. Failing to do so, it retreated further into a kind of legal isolation from
the international community.
Sale is surely wrong, but depicts a surreal picture. There is a hazy indis-
tinctness to the claims of faceless people at sea. They have no identities, names,
120. Id. at 9.
121. See Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104 YALE LJ. 39, 45
(1994).
122. 509 U.S. at 207 (Blackmun J., dissenting) (quoting Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6
U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 117-118 (1804)).
123. Convention, supra note 74, Art 33(1), 189 U.N.T.S. at 176.
124. Blackmun, supra note 121, at 43. Similarly, Professor Louis Henkin characterized Sale as
an "eccentric, highly implausible interpretation of a treaty." He asked, "is it not time for the U.S.
Supreme Court to think afresh about its role in determining and applying international law and
obligations, and to assure that they are faithfully complied with?" Louis Henkin, Notes from the
President, Am. Soc'Y OF INT'L LAW NEWSLETrER, (American Society of International Law, Wash-
ington, D.C.) Sept.-Oct. 1993.
125. Respondent's brief at 13-14, supra note 119.
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or personal stories of actual persecution. Moreover, the Court was responding to
what many regarded as a crisis, in which those who set sail faced enormous
risks at sea and the President had spoken to the issue. The Court's next encoun-
ter with withholding was very different. Contrasting vividly, this case presents
all the themes discussed here. Chevron and Charming Betsy are in unmistakable
conflict, as the Court struggled unsuccessfully to align domestic law with inter-
national norms.
C. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre126 & Chevron Implications
Juan Anibal Aguirre-Aguirre fled his native Guatemala and entered the
United States without inspection.'27 Facing deportation in 1984, he sought asy-
lum and withholding of deportation. At a hearing before an Immigration Judge,
he testified that he had been politically active with a student group called Es-
tudeante Syndicado (ES) with the National Central Union political party from
1989 to 1992. Apparently Aguirre, with other students, protested government
policies and actions by setting buses afire after having removed their occupants.
These actions were in protest to threats, mysterious deaths and disappearances
of activists, and the raising of student fares to apparently unconscionable levels.
The Immigration Judge found Aguirre "a credible witness worthy of be-
lief."'12 He granted Aguirre's request for both asylum and withholding. Though
the INS argued that Aguirre was a terrorist, the judge found that no one was hurt
and Aguirre's acts were politically motivated.129 Indeed, addressing those argu-
ments he said, "Guatemala is a very violent country with a long history of cru-
elty, civil strife and human rights violations by the government, by right wing
government support groups, and by the guerillas. His activities and those of his
fellow students must be viewed in this perspective. ' 3 Aguirre had clearly en-
gaged in protest, but had not been convicted of anything in Guatemala. His indi-
vidual involvement in these activities had not been established except in the
most general terms from his testimony.131 Moreover, the Immigration Judge
who heard that testimony found him worthy of these two forms of protection,
126. 526 U.S. 415, 421 (1999).
127. See id. at 421.
128. Administrative Record in Aguirre-Aguirre at 51 (reproduced in Respondent's Brief in Im-
migration and Naturalization Service v. Aguirre-Aguirre at 7, 1999 WL 26721 (No. 97-1754)
(Jan. 21, 1999)).
129. See id. at 54.
130. Id. at 54-55.
131. This is no trivial concern, for criminal liability turns on the fusion of the guilty act along
with the requisite mental state for a particular offense. Absent some sense of just what crime he
might have committed based on those elements, the existence and level of his criminal liability are
entirely uncertain.
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having explicitly concluded that he faced a clear probability of persecution in
Guatemala.
The INS appealed this decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals, fo-
cusing on essentially one issue. Both the iNA and the Convention deny humani-
tarian relief under some narrowly drawn exceptions. Here, the issue was
whether there were "serious reasons" for considering that he had committed "a
serious nonpolitical crime outside the United States ' ',32 prior to his arrival here.
In an unpublished opinion, the Board reversed the Immigration Judge. Address-
ing the nonpolitical crime exception, it said:
We also find that the criminal nature of the respondent's acts outweigh their
political nature. The respondent testified that the primary source of their dis-
pleasure from the government arose from its seeming inaction in the investi-
gation of student deaths and in its raising of student bus fares. The ire of the
ES manifested itself disproportionately in the destruction of property and as-
saults on civilians. Although the ES had a political agenda, those goals were
outweighed by their criminal strategy of strikes violent enough to attract the
attention of the main combatants in the Guatemalan conflict. Consequently,
we find that the respondent is barred from withholding of deportation and do
not need to address the issue of his statutory eligibility for this relief.133
Thus, without any specific findings of fact about Aguirre's personal wrongdo-
ing, the Board, in that single paragraph, decried the actions of the students, ap-
parently ascribing equal blame to one and all.
What is missing there remains telling. Guilt is personal, yet there is nothing
concrete mentioned about what Aguirre did. Similarly, there is no mention of
what crimes he committed and the penalties provided under Guatemalan law.
There is no weighing of his political objectives against his criminal conduct,
except for the conclusion stated that his crimes outweighed them and, at that, his
behavior was conflated with that of the ES.34 Finally, there is no reference at all
to the Convention, or to any interpretations of its exclusion clauses. Instead, the
Board quoted § 243(h)135 and the McMullen case. 36 The paragraph quoted pro-
132. 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (b)(3)(B)(iii) (1996). The analogue in the Convention is Art. l(F)(b).
133. Petitioner's brief in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Aguirre-Aguirre, (No. 97-
1754) (Dec. 4, 1998), 1998 WL 858535. Unpublished opinion of the Board included in Appendix
B to Petitioner's Brief 12a-18a.).
134. Elsewhere in its opinion, the Board recounted Aguirre's frightening account of his experi-
ences in Guatemala, including letters threatening the ES that members would "disappear" if the
protests continued and an apparent threat on his life from the government. Id. at 14a-15a.
135. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
136. The Board quoted from In re McMullen, 19 I & N Dec. 90, 97-98 (BIA 1984). Its opinion
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vides the entirety of the Board's examination of whether Aguirre, whom the
Immigration Judge concluded was a refugee, should nevertheless be denied
refugee protection because of his criminal conduct.
The Ninth Circuit court of appeals reversed.1 37 Relying heavily on the
UNHCR Handbook, it concluded that the Board erred in three respects. It failed
to follow Ninth Circuit precedent, did not consider the persecution Aguirre
might face if returned to Guatemala, and did not properly weigh the character of
Aguirre's crimes in relation to his political objectives. 138 Reading the exclusion
clauses very narrowly, it concluded that one such as Aguirre should be excluded
for his crimes only "for the most serious reasons.' 39
Judge Kleinfeld filed an angry dissent. Feeling that asylum law should not
provide refuge for "violent criminals," he felt this country should be a "haven
for innocent people fleeing persecution," not a "haven for thugs."' 40 Appalled by
the uncontrolled nature of these student activities, he showed a clear disgust at
the majority's view. Thus, never citing to the Handbook or any similar source,
he lambasted the majority, concluding that the Board reasonably concluded that
"Aguirre-Aguirre's crimes were disproportionate to his political objectives.' 41
This is a human rights case. Its facts seem distant and hazy, but the death
threats to Aguirre do not. We must not lose sight of the gravity of Aguirre's
situation simply because of the difficulty of grasping or relating to the dreadful
political climate in Guatemala. During the years of his protest activities, Guate-
mala had one of the worst records in the world for gross human rights abuses.
42
It had the third highest incidence of "disappearances" among the nineteen coun-
tries in which they were common, 143 and political upheavals were responsible
for the deaths of 100,000 civilians and the disappearance of 40,000 others dur-
ing the same period.'" Indeed, though protesting rising bus fares may seem triv-
ial to us, the student protest against the 100% hike in 1990 was met with violent
governmental suppression. 45 Government and the private sector could not be
there said that withholding could be denied if the "crime is grossly out of proportion to the politi-
cal objective." Id.
137. See Aguirre-Aguirre v. INS, 121 F.3d 521 (9th Cir. 1997).
138. See id. at 523.
139. Id. at 524 (quoting from Guy S. GOODWIN-GnI, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 107
(2d ed. 1996)).
140. Id. at 526 (Kleinfeld J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 525.
142. See TOM BARRY, INSIDE GUATEMALA 32 (1992).
143. Id. This information was reported by the United Nations Working Group on Forced or In-
voluntary Disappearances.
144. See id.
145. See Brief of Massachusetts Law Reform Commission at 18, INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526
U.S. 415 (1999) (No. 97-1754).
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neatly separated. This is simply part of the backdrop to this case, one easily
overlooked in the distant locale and culture of this country.
Compounding Aguirre's dilemma, his attorney did not file a brief with the
Board, thus compromising his representation. The Board's action did not reflect
the full representation of counsel that one would hope for in a case of such ob-
vious magnitude. On this record, and in view of the remarkable and almost in-
conceivable nature of the facts, the case proceeded to the Supreme Court.
The Court's opinion in Aguirre represents a convergence of all themes
mentioned here. It said nothing about the purpose of the exclusion clauses,
scarcely addressed the language itself and, in what is effectively a death penalty
case, chided Aguirre for his attorney's failure to file a brief with the Board.146 It
did not simply fail to recognize the gravity of the case; it trivialized it in the
most dismal fashion. And, worse, its domestication of human rights law re-
flected a deepening legal isolationism and near contempt for international
norms.
The Court faced a clear methodological choice. It could rubberstamp the
Board through the use of Chevron or it could repeat its approach of Cardoza-
Fonseca by dealing with world opinion and scholarly commentary. Charming
Betsy is significant not simply because it compels an adherence to definitive
international norms, but because the very recognition of that concept reflects a
willingness to grasp the magnitude of the issues regarding the Court's position
in the international legal community. The Court's failure even to cite that case
was enormously significant.The opinion broke rather evenly into two parts. Acknowledging our adher-
ence to the Protocol,'47 the Court discussed our Refugee Act as well as the Con-
vention. It parsed both the domestic and international components of this case.
Its discussion of the Handbook reflects its rejection of international guidance
and Cardoza-Fonseca itself. In that case, it rejected administrative practice.
Commenting on the importance of the Handbook, it said "the Handbook pro-
vides significant guidance in construing the Protocol, to which Congress sought
to conform."' 8 Yet, in Aguirre, the Handbook only provided "some" guid-
ance.149 A clear sign of the mood of the Court, this language signaled the course
146. "He failed to submit a brief on the causal link or any other issue to the BIA, and the deci-
sion of the Immigration Judge does not address the point. In these circumstances, the rather cur-
sory nature of the BIA 's discussion does not warrant reversal. " 526 U.S. at 432 (emphasis added).
Elsewhere, the Court noted "[r]espondent did not file a brief with the BIA, although his request
for an extension of time to do so was granted." Id. at 422.
147. See id at 427.
148. 480 U.S. at 439 (emphasis added). Though the Handbook is not binding on members of the
international community, it has been followed extensively and the Court's endorsement of it is
fairly typical.
149 Citing to Cardoza-Fonseca, the Court said "[w]e agree the U.N. Handbook provides some
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of the opinion.
The Handbook is quite detailed about the exclusion clauses. The purpose of
the exclusion is to "protect the community of a receiving country from the dan-
ger of admitting a refugee who has committed a serious common crime. '' 5s To
achieve that end, the Handbook recommended an examination of the political
nature of the offense"5 ' and a balancing of that offense against the danger facing
the applicant.15 2 Thus, "if a person has a well-founded fear of very severe perse-
cution, e.g., persecution endangering his life or freedom, a crime must be very
grave in order to exclude him."',5a According to the UNHCR brief in Aguirre,
the exclusion clauses are narrow in order to achieve the "core purpose of the
Convention . . . to safeguard the rights of vulnerable individuals who, by virtue
of the grave consequences that might await them in their homelands, are in need
and deserving of international protection. '54
Dismissing the Handbook as not binding on domestic law, 55 the Court
relied neither on it nor on scholarly commentary to determine the scope of the
exclusion clauses. Instead, it viewed the language through the prism of the
Board's opinion, concluding that it comported with the plain meaning of those
clauses. First, it rejected the view that the Board should have weighed the grav-
ity of the offenses against the potential persecution Aguirre faced. By its reason-
ing, "it is not obvious that an already-completed crime is somehow rendered less
serious by considering the further circumstance that the alien may be subject to
persecution if returned to his home country.' 56 That might be true based on the
bare language, but the purpose of the clauses indicates otherwise.
guidance in construing the provisions added to the INA by the Refugee Act." Aguirre, 526 U.S. at
427.
150. Handbook, supra note 92, at paragraph 151.
151. See id. at paragraph 152 ("The political element of the offence should also outweigh its
common-law character. This would not be the case if the acts committed are grossly out of propor-
tion to the alleged objective.").
152. See id. at paragraph 156. ("In applying this exclusion clause, it is also necessary to strike
balance between the nature of the offense presumed to have been committed by the applicant and
the degree of persecution feared.").
153. Id.
154. Brief of Amici Curiae Office of the United Nations High Commissioner For Refugees at 5,
INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 1999 WL 33437 (Jan. 21, 1999) (No. 97-1754). Scholarly commentators
uniformly agree. According to Grahl-Madsen, the exclusion clauses serve two purposes: to pre-
vent granting refugee status to people who might jeopardize the internal security of asylum coun-
tries and to prevent the abuse of this status by fugitives to justice. See A. ATLE GRAHL-MADsEN,
THE STATUS OF REFUGEES iN INTERNATIONAL LAW 290 (1966). Similarly, according to James
Hathaway, "because these clauses are to be applied only in relation to persons who otherwise
present a prima facie need for protection, they ought reasonably to be strictly construed." JAMES
C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 189 (1991).
155. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S 415, 427-28 (1999).
156. Id. at 426.
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In Pushpanathan v. Canada,157 the Supreme Court of Canada adopted a
radically different approach. There, it considered the excludability of a drug
trafficker under another, related, exclusion clause. 158 It also faced an adverse
administrative determination, but concluded that the "starting point of the inter-
pretative exercise is, first, to define the purpose of the Convention as a whole,
and, second, the purpose and place of Article IF(c) within that scheme.', 159 That
Court determined that the exclusion clauses should be interpreted very narrowly.
Since the "denial of the fundamental protections of a treaty whose purpose is the
protection of human rights is a drastic exception to the purposes of the Conven-
tion... [it] can only be justified where the protection of those rights is furthered
by the exclusion. ' ' 6l Accordingly, that Court found the appellant's conspiracy to
traffic in narcotics did not warrant the application of the exclusion clause.16'
Our Court, instead, dealt with the Handbook as if it were some hostile item.
Never discussing the purpose of the Convention or exclusion clauses, it still
concluded that the "BIA's determination that § 1253(h)(2)(C) requires no addi-
tional balancing of the risk of persecution rests on a fair and permissible reading
of the statute."162 Yet the practice of the international community is clear and
uniform. The UNHCR brief in this case argued that balancing is required since
the Handbook position represents more than four decades of State practice.1 63
And, that practice was recently reaff'rmed by the 15 member States of the Euro-
pean Union, who issued an official statement saying, "[tihe severity of the ex-
pected persecution is to be weighed against the nature of the criminal of-
fense." 16 By the terms of the Vienna Convention, that practice simply must be
157. [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982.
158. Art. IF(c) excludes from humanitarian coverage anyone who "has been guilty of acts con-
trary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations." See Geneva Convention, supra note
75.
159. 1 S.C.R. at 1022.
160. Id. at 1035.
161. See id. at 1036.
162. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 428 (1999).
163. See UNHCR Brief, supra note 155, at 20 (indicating that the balancing test "reflects the
common understanding of States regarding the application of that provision over a span of more
than four decades after the effective date of the Convention"). Id. That the UNHCR is authorita-
tive is unquestioned. In a recent British case, the court was highly deferential to a letter written
from a UNHCR Deputy Representative to Britain to appellant. It said that though the letter can be
no more than "persuasive" it did "represent the distillation of the collective wisdom of the Com-
mission which has been concerned with supervising the operation of the Convention on a world
wide basis since it first came into effect." Danian v. Secretary of the Home Dep't., Supreme Court
of Judicature in the Court of Appeal, [2000] IMM AR 96 (Eng. C.A. 1999). The court gave the
letter great, even determinative weight.
164. Council of the European Union's Joint Position on the Harmonized Application of the
definition of the Term 'Refugee,' at 13, E.U. Doc. No 96/196/JHA (1996) available at:
http'J/europa.eu.inteur-lex/en/lif/dat/1996/en_396F0196.htm.
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The Court next rejected the Handbook requirement that there should be a
causal link between the crime and political purpose. 166 Though the Board pur-
ported to weigh his political objectives against the severity of his crimes, the
Ninth Circuit found error in its failure to analyze this requirement of examining
this causal nexus in determining what drove the applicant's actions. 67 By its
view, an analysis of this causal link was a component of the overall analysis
because one cannot coherently talk about weighing the crime against its political
objectives without examining those objectives. Since the task is to determine the
dangerousness of the offender, presumably, the political rather than personal
motive of the applicant is most relevant. 68
The Court disagreed. Though admitting that the Board's analysis was
"brief," even "cursory,"1 69 it noted that Aguirre had failed to submit a brief on
this point and concluded that the Board's discussion did not warrant reversal. 170
The Court virtually found that Aguirre had waived this issue, again emphatically
165. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provides that in interpreting a treaty "there shall be
taken into account .... (b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty ..." Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (1969). The UNHCR brief also points out
that the Court itself has ruled that "the practice of signatories to a treaty 'cannot be ignored' when
construing its meaning." UNHCR brief, supra note 154, at 20 (citing to Trans World Airlines, Inc.
v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 260 (1984)).
166. Paragraph 152 of the Handbook requires that "[tihere should also be a close and direct
causal link between the crime committed and its alleged political purpose and object." Handbook,
supra note 93. Yet, the Court in Aguirre said that "[w]hatever independent relevance a causal link
inquiry might have in another case, in this case the BIA determined respondent's acts were not
political based on the lack of proportion with his objectives. It was not required to do more." 526
U.S. at 432.
167. See Aguirre-Aguirre v. INS, 121 F.3d at 523-24 (9th Cir. 1987).
168. The Ninth Circuit concluded that his political purpose was to challenge a government that
had murdered its own citizens. By its analysis, in weighing Aguirre's degree of wrongdoing, the
Board should have considered this balance then between his political and personal motives. It
went on to say, somewhat colorfully, that:
[wlhen you are dealing with an ass it may be necessary to move the beast by a blow on
a sensitive part even though what you want to move are the feet. When you are dealing
with a government which is an accomplice or an accessory to terroristic methods of
government, you need to use forceful measures to draw the government's attention to
your protest; your political objective is a governmental response, you look for a sensi-
tive area.
Id. Thus, if the purpose of the exclusion clause is to protect the receiving country from the danger
posed by serious criminals, the political motive of applicants has a substantial bearing on whether
they should be characterized as more as political actors than, as Judge Kleinfeld said, "thug[s]."
Id. at 526.
169. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 415, 432 (1999).
170. See id.
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breaking ranks with its international counterparts.
The Ninth Circuit urged a sophisticated approach to the exclusion clauses.
It faulted the Board for its cursory analysis, but its insistence that the weighing
test be supplemented by "examining additional factors' i7' prompted some of the
Court's harshest criticism. It was here that Chevron took center stage and the
Court's analysis of the issues was most parochial.
Chevron involved a construction by the EPA of the requirements of the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977.172 This case was before the Supreme Court
because the Circuit Court disagreed with the EPA. The Court recognized the
inherent incompleteness of statutes, thereby acknowledging the need for the
administrative system to interpret statutes in the exercise of its delegated author-
ity. It then generated a two-step test to be used in the review of agency interpre-
tations. If Congress has spoken directly to an issue and its intent is clear, that
view must be followed. If, however, it has been silent or ambiguous, the
agency's view must be upheld so long as it represents a "permissible construc-
tion of the statute."' 173 This test reflects both an acknowledgment of agency ex-
pertise and the appropriateness for the Executive branch of government to make
such policy choices. 1
74
It is unclear, though, exactly what the Board did in Aguirre. Certainly, un-
like the EPA, it did not fill in substance to the open texture of a statute. The
Board reiterated its view in McMullen175 and briefly analyzed the facts of the
case. Thus, in an unpublished, non-precedent decision, 176 the Board simply de-
171. Id. at 424.
172. Chevron USA, Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
173. Id. at 843.
174. See id. at 865-66. The Court stated:
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of the
Government. Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, but
not on the basis of the judges' personal policy preferences. In contrast, an agency to
which Congress has delegated policy- making responsibilities may, within the limits of
that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views of wise policy
to inform its judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the
Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Gov-
ernment to make such policy choices-resolving the competing interests which Con-
gress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by
the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.
Id.
175. "We have held that '[i]n evaluating the political nature of a crime, we consider it important
that the political aspect of the offense outweigh its common-law character. This would not be the
case if the crime is grossly out of proportion to the political objective ... ' INS Brief, supra note
133, at 17-a (citing to In re McMullen, 19 1 & N Dec 90, 97-98 (1984)).
176. See supra note 68. The Board designates certain important decisions as precedent decision
through a largely informal process.
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cided a case. It lent no new interpretation to the Refugee Act and did not even
mention the Convention. Perhaps that was why the Ninth Circuit reviewed its
decision de novo.177 The Court emphatically reversed the Ninth Circuit on the
construction of the withholding exclusion clause.
178
Here the Chevron deference was most extreme. First, the Court commented
on the Ninth Circuit's failure to defer to the Board, criticizing it for failing to
apply the Chevron test. Stating that "principles of Chevron deference are appli-
cable to this statutory scheme,"' 179 it concluded that the Ninth Circuit erred by
failing to follow those principles. "°
The Court, rather remarkably, next fortified the notion of Chevron defer-
ence. It first repeated its views from Abudu that deference is "especially appro-
priate" in the immigration context where officials exercise sensitive political
functions.' 8' Explaining further the reasons for such heightened deference the
Court said:
A decision by the Attorney General to deem certain violent offenses commit-
ted in another country as political in nature, and to allow the perpetrators to
remain in the United States, may affect our relations with that country or its
neighbors. The judiciary is not well positioned to shoulder primary responsi-
bility for assessing the likelihood and importance of such diplomatic reper-
cussions.18
2
Chevron plainly acknowledged the attenuated political responsiveness of mem-
bers of agencies. 8 3 It nevertheless called for deference because agencies were at
least indirectly answerable to the Chief Executive. l84 But this has simply gone
too far. The members of the Board do not, and must not, play any role in the
formulation of foreign policy. They are administrative law judges whose func-
tion is to decide immigration appeals. Their job, in the language of Ronald
Dworkin, is to decide cases on principle, not to formulate foreign policy in the
guise of deciding cases.
185
177. See Aguirre, 121 F.3d at 523.
178. See Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 424.
179. id.
180. See id. at 425.
181. See id. The oddity of that view has already been examined in this article's PART I discus-
sion of Abudu.
182. Id.
183. Chevron, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
184. Id. at 865-66.
185. Much of Dworkin's work is based on this dichotomy. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Hard
Cases, 88 HARv. L REv. 1057, 1060 (1975). Dworkin insisted there, as he has since, that
"[plolicy decisions must therefore be made through the operation of some political process de-
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Doherty concerned the actions of two Attorneys General while Sale con-
cerned a conflict in the implementation of an Executive Order of the President.
In Aguirre, by contrast, the Court dealt with an unpublished, opaque opinion of
a Board panel that was not even selected for precedent status. Political account-
ability was so low that the signature line of the Board opinion in Petitioner's
brief says "signature illegible." 1'
Plainly, at times Chevron fits poorly in the modern administrative state, at
least in immigration law. At its core, the Court's deference is based only on the
Board being within the Executive branch of government. Yet Chevron does not
create an administrative monolith. The same level of deference need not be af-
forded to all members of this administrative community in all circumstances.
Deference should be highest when agencies demonstrate serious focus on the
issues. Had this been a published, precedent decision of the entire Board, it
should have commanded more respect. Had it been evident that the Board, in-
deed, did its job carefully, deference would have been more appropriate.187
However, when an agency shows so little care in its work product as did the
Board here, the rationale for deference begins to dissolve. The complete failure
of the Board to even mention the Handbook, let alone discuss or weigh the in-
terests of the international community, evidences the poverty of its work prod-
uct.
The Canadian Supreme Court's opinion in Pushpanathan contrasts dra-
matically with Aguirre. Guided by a sense of the gravity of the moment and the
purpose of the exclusion clauses, that Court recognized the limitations of the
administrative state in the human rights area. Rejecting a highly deferential
signed to produce an accurate expression of the different interests that should be taken into ac-
count." Id. at 1061.
186. Petitioner's brief in INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, supra note 133, at 18a.
187. Circuit courts have a long history of requiring that the Board does its job before deference
is owed. In the wake of Wang, for example, many courts imposed procedural requirements upon
the Board. See, e.g., Ravancho v. INS, 658 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1981) (requiring the Board to con-
sider the totality of the circumstances regarding hardship); Jara-Navarrette v. INS, 813 F.2d 1340,
1342 (9th Cir. 1986) (criticizing the Board's "cursory and generalized analysis" of the potential
harm to the U.S. citizen children). In a recent opinion from the Second Circuit, Judge Calabresi
addressed this issue. There, the court was reviewing the Board's interpretation of the term "moral
turpitude." The court generally concluded that deference was owed to its interpretation of immi-
gration laws. Writing separately, Judge Calabresi said that:
JU]nder Chevron, we may defer to an agency interpretation only if the agency has ade-
quately explained its rationale and the factual basis for its decision . . . . Our inquiry
should be more searching . . . and, at the least, in order to find that the agency's [sic]
construction is reasonable, we should be able to point to evidence that it considered the
matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion.
Michel v. INS, 206 F.3d 253, 268 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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standard for the judicial review of board decisions, it established one of correct-
ness. It did so because "the Board's expertise in matters relating to human rights
is far less developed than that of human rights tribunals." 18 Finding little rela-
tionship between the Board's area of expertise and the exclusion clauses, the
Court adopted this strikingly non-deferential standard of correctness. Our U.S.
Supreme Court should follow this view, and construct a new relationship be-
tween Charming Betsy and Chevron that strikes a balance between deference
and a recognition of its obligation to acknowledge and enforce international
norms.
IV. CONCLUSION
These cases decided by the United States Supreme Court are disturbing. In
each, the aliens won in the Circuit Court. In each, the appellate court engaged in
reasoned analysis, regarding the issues contextually so that language was subor-
dinated to purpose. Rather than regarding statutes as "a series of ad hoc deals,"
the courts recognized and vindicated the values for which they stood.1 89 Yet in
each, the Court not only undid these rational results, but also entirely shunned
even the notion of statutory purpose in the process.
Statutory purpose should not be confused with legislative intent. For years,
Justice Scalia has inveighed, quite correctly, against the use of legislative his-
tory to interpret statutes.19° A legislature cannot "intend" some meaning, for it is
made up of myriad subgroups, and documents such as committee reports only
represent the anonymous thinking of those subgroups. Purpose is different and
inheres in the very notion of a statute.
Hart and Sacks pointed out that the search for statutory purpose is no Uto-
pian notion in which some "well-wisher" engages in an arcane process of divi-
nation. Rather, it is quite straightforward. Citing to the famous Sixteenth Cen-
tury Heydon's Case,' 91 they developed a remarkably simple approach to the
188. Pushpanathan v. Canada, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982, at paragraph 47.
189. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Value in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L REv.
1007, 1036 (1989). Professor Eskridge pointed out that "statutes embody some overall policy
rationality." Id. By his thinking, then, the interpretation of statutes should involve discerning the
internal coherence of various provisions of a statute, fitting a statute coherently within a group of
related laws and assuring that the statute develops coherently over time.
190. From his days on the D.C. Circuit, Justice Scalia has maintained this attack on intentional-
ism. See generally Hirschey v. FERC, 777 F.2d 1, 7-8 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia J., concurring.) As
Eskridge and Frickey put it, "[c]ommittee members and bill sponsors are not necessarily represen-
tative of the entire Congress, and so it is not necessarily accurate to attribute their statements to
the whole body." Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 9, at 327. Moreover, they go on to criticize any
approach that gives weight to the view of a legislative subgroup.
191. See Heydon's Case, Exchequer, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (1584) (reprinted in HENRY M. HART, JR.
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task. As that nugget points out, an analysis should begin with an examination of
the preexisting law to determine the "mischief and defect for which the common
law did not provide."' 92 Then, the task was to determine what Parliament's rem-
edy was for this problem.
This translates easily today. At the Board level, there is the opportunity to
keep constant oversight over statutes so that these interpretations keep pace with
domestic and international developments. Though the Board has enjoyed some
success here,193 failures such as Aguirre are troubling. At the same time, judicial
review exists to correct such failures. Even though the Court followed blindly in
Aguirre, hopefully, with the addition of members to the Board and the resultant
broadening of its perspective, it can fulfill the promise Eskridge and Frickey
foresaw for agencies under Chevron.
94
The problems for the Court are serious. Having embarked on an approach
that even Justice Stevens admitted might eviscerate the spirit of the law,' 95 the
Court has built a body of precedent unlikely to be undone easily. It has lost its
way as a major court in the international community. In rejecting purpose, re-
nouncing the spirit of the law in favor of slavish deference and linguistic myo-
pia, the Court has done a terrible disservice to human rights and the orderly and
humane development of the law.
Much has been lost as a result of the Court's decisions. The litigants have
suffered losses, as has the law. But perhaps an even greater loss is to judicial
review itself. The Judiciary and Executive are not locked in some conflict in
which either courts must defer readily or be accused of usurping executive func-
tion. Rather, they can and should engage in a dialogic process through which
they work together to further the development of the law. If, as in Aguirre, the
Executive branch does not do its job, it should be reversed and learn as a result.
It should be encouraged to engage in careful consideration of very serious ques-
tions, and lazy efforts such as those in Aguirre should result in reversal.
The last few decades have seen an explosion of scholarly discussion of
& ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PRocEss: BAsic PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPICATION OF
LAw 1111 (William Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip Frickey eds., 1994)).
192. Id.
193. For example, In re Kasinga, 211 & N Dec. 357 (BIA)(en banc 1996) concluded that the
prospect of female genital mutilation provided the basis for an asylum claim. Although the major-
ity opinion was somewhat cryptic, several members concurred. Member Rosenberg's opinion was
particularly important for the manner in which she brought Kassinga's claim within the concept of
gender-based persecution. On a whole, then, the Board was active and responsive to that difficult,
though somewhat unconventional claim.
194. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 9, at 327 (elaborating on agencies and dynamic statu-
tory interpretation).
195. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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statutory interpretation, which has not been limited to academics.196 Rather, the
works of Calabresi, 9' Easterbrook,' 98 Posner,199 Scalia,20° and others have all
advanced the cause of interpretation. Strangely, though, much of this robust
debate has been lost on the Court. Though Justice Scalia's influence is evident,
the Court seems largely oblivious to these developments. The irony is signifi-
cant and unfortunate. In an area in which we want the Court to be most expert, it
is most deficient. Unless it advances with the legal community around it, we
will bear continuing witness to the flagging spirit of the law.
196. Surely Ronald Dworkin and others have played a major role in spurring debates. See, e.g.,
Ronald Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 TEx. L REv. 527, 541-43 (1982). Dworkin's idea of
interpretation as a "chain novel" created an inspired way of understanding interpretation and dy-
namic theories of interpretation.
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